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I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that the Supreme Court has implicitly read
Confrontation Clause requirements into the standard for the admission of statements against interest. As a result, the Court has constitutionalized 804(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law. B.A., Hamilton College;J.D., Cornell University. I wish to thank Leonard N. Sosnov, Linda E. Carter,
and Thomas K Clancy for their suggestions and Bobbie G. Styer and Millicent N.
Wise for their research assistance.
I See FED. R. EvlD. 804(b) (3). Rule 804(b) (3) defines a statement against interest as:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to sub-
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In the course of making this argument, this article defines the
statement against interest exception and collateral statements 2 and
discusses the rationale for admitting collateral statements!5 The article examines the three forms of reliability that have been implicitly
used in Confrontation Clause analysis but not often explicitly distinguished. 4 It then describes in detail the case of Williamson v. United
States," in which this conflation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the federal rule on statements against interest took place."
The article then discusses the pre-Williamson authority for resolving
statement against interest admission problems7 and addresses the effect of the Court's decision on the Confrontation Clause analysis of
statements against interest and some of the difficulties involved in
applying the Court's holding." The article concludes with a suggestion for how statement against interest admission issues might be
better handled and what the appropriate place of Confrontation
Clause analysis should be.6
When the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari in Williamson v. United States,'0 many hoped that the decision would clarify
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence" and the place of statements
against interest under Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 804(b) (3).2

Id.

ject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true ....

2 See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. The term "contextual" has also
been used. See CHARLzs T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVDFNCrE § 256, at 552-53 (1954).
3 See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying
text.
4 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
512 U.S. 594 (1994).
6 See infra notes 101-149 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 155-173 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 207-271 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 272-290 and accompanying text.

510 U.S. 1039 (1994).
See Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring
FoundationalTesting and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REv.
149, 165-69 (1995) (arguing that, to admit hearsay for purposes of Confrontation
Clause analysis, judges should make a decision about the evidence's "foundational
adequacy" and also require corroboration of that hearsay); see also Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted". Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. Rav. 1,
34-39, 46 (1987) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should move away from the
"firmly rooted" concept in its Confrontation Clause analysis and adopt a standard
that focuses on the trustworthiness of hearsay statements in the context of each
case).
12 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The rule allows, in part, for the introduction of
hearsay statements that were, at the time of their making, "so far contrary to the de-
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In his petition for the writ, Williamson posed the question of
whether the statement against interest exception should be considered a firmly rooted hearsay exception' and, thus, presumptively reliable and admissible without additional Confrontation Clause analysis. 14

Assuming that the Court would not find statements against

interest to be a firmly rooted exception, Williamson asked whether
the confession introduced in the case bore sufficient indications of
reliability to render it admissible under the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 5
The Court failed to decide whether the statement against interest exception is firmly rooted16 or whether the statements against interest in Williamson had sufficient "indicia of reliability""7 to be admissible under Confrontation Clause analysis. Instead, the Court
ducked these issues and based the decision on its interpretation of
the word "statement" in F.RE. 804(b) (3).'8 The Court defined the
term statement to mean a single remark or declaration 9 rather than
an extended declaration. The Court also decided that only those
remarks that are individually self-inculpatory are included within
F.R.E. 804(b) (3). The Court found that the 804(b) (3) exception did
clarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant
to civil or criminal liability... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." Id.
s See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)) (explaining that "no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception'");
see also infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
14 Petition for aWrit of Certiorari at i, Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594
(1994) (No. A-942).
15 See id. The Confrontation Clause provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against
him...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. In his petition, Williamson also asked
"[w]hether 804(b) (3)'s requirement that a statement must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness [ I is subject to the further requirement of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), that the only circumstances that
can be considered are those surrounding the making of the statement?" Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (No.
A-942).
16 See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994). Various United
States Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue and reached contrary results.
CompareUnited States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
exception is not firmly rooted) with United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
1989) (finding the exception to be firmly rooted).
17 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Supreme Court found that the
statement of an unavailable witness "is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia
of reliability.'" Id.
s See Wiiamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
19 Seeid.
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not include portions of a declaration that are "collateral statements,
even ones that are neutral as to interest .... ""0 The foundation of
the Court's analysis was that statements against interest are a hearsay
exception because they are reliable. The Court explained that such
statements are reliable because they are against interest and that only
the self-inculpatory portion of a declaration is sufficiently reliable to
be admissible as a statement against interest."
In deciding the case by defining the word "statement" and remanding the case to the lower court for application of that definition,' the Court expressly avoided the Confrontation Clause issue
and did not decide whether the statement against interest exception
is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." The Court also expressly dodged the issue of whether the corroboration requirement
in F.R.E. 804(b) (3) for the admission of statements exculpating the
accused" is also applicable to statements inculpating the accused.2
The effect of the Williamson decision is to narrow the scope of
the statement against interest exception. As noted, it also implicitly
conflates Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with the federal rule
on statements against interest.
II. A PRIMER ON STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Because of the plethora of television lawyers and televised trials,
persons in the United States believe that hearsay is inadmissible and
understand hearsay to be an in-court witness's statement about
something said out of court by another. As evidence students know,
this concept is only the beginning of an understanding or misunderstanding of hearsay. As defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence,
"[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."" Rule 802 makes hearsay generally
inadmissible.2 Of course, much hearsay is admissible under the
" Id. at 600.
21
22
23
24

Seeid.
See id. at 604.
See id. at 605.
See FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3). "Astatement tending to expose the declarant to

criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless cor-

roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Id.
25 See Wil/iamson, 512 U.S.
at 605.
FED. R. EVil. 801(c).
27 See Fmn. R. Evm. 802. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
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rules 2 8 and in fact, the prohibition against the admission is in danger
of being swallowed by the exceptions.2
Hearsay exceptions are generally established by balancing the
m In some instances, relineed for the evidence against its reliability."
ability may be marginal. For example, dying declarations"' may be
highly unreliable. 2 The linchpin for truthfulness in such declarations is that one does not meet one's maker with a lie on the lips.5
Apart from whether this assumption about human behavior and the
dying declarant's motivation is correct, the declarant may have only
stated an assumption about the cause of death, and these assumptions are unlikely to be tested when death is impending.3 Despite
the potential unreliability of such statements, the exception was established in homicide cases to compensate for the unavailability of
the declarant.35
Need was also a factor in establishing the statement against interest exception, which, in addition, depends on the unavailability of

authority or by Act of Congress." Id.
28 SeeFED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)-(5).
See Robert E. Oliphant, Basic Concepts in the Law of Evidence; An Outline of the
Younger Lectures, at 83 (2d ed. 1982);Jacob A. Stein, Trial Handbook For Maryland
Lawyers §26.5, at 360 (2d ed. 1986).
See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 1954). The
court concluded: "[O]ur holding is supported ... by the absence here of the rational justification which obtains in every recognized exception to the hearsay rule;
that is a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, and a necessity for the evidence." Id; see also G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d
Cir. 1913) in which Judge Learned Hand, then a district court judge, stated, "I
think it fair to insist that to reject such a statement is to refuse evidence about the
truth of which no reasonable person should have any doubt whatever, because it
fulfills both the requisites of an exception of the hearsay rule, necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness." Id. (citingJOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422, 1690 (Ist ed. 1913).
31 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (2). "Statement under belief of impending death. In a
prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a
declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the
cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death." Id.
32 For a discussion of the unreliability of dying declarations, see Goldman, supra
note 11, at 1-2.
33 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 281 (E. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984); see also 5 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WxNsmlIN's EVIDENCE, § 804(b) (2) (1985).
S4 For example, persons surrounding the dying person
are unlikely to ask questions such as, "Are you sure?" and "Did you get a good look at him?" Despite this
lack of testing, a prosecutor in a homicide case will likely be able to introduce the
deceased's statement naming an assailant. SeeFED. R. Evil. 804(b) (2).
35 See generally Leonard R. Jaffee, The Constitution and Proof by Dead or
Unconfrontable Declarants, 33 Ai. L. REV. 227 (1979) (discussing the development of the dying declaration exception).
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the declarant for its admission.' Of course, the linchpin of the exception is that the statement is against the declarant's interest. At
common law, the exception applied only to statements against proprietary or pecuniary interest,- but later, various states and the federal system added penal interest." As with statements against pecuniary and proprietary interests, declarations against penal interest
rest upon "the assumption that persons do not make statements
which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason
that they are true... [and that] exposure to punishment for crime
[is] a sufficient stake." 4° Of course, as with other statements against
interest, in applying the declaration against penal interest exception,
one is involved in a fact-intensive inquiry as to whether the statement
truly was against the declarant's interest at the time it was made.4' In
addition, the precondition of unavailability makes this inquiry more
difficult.
One reason for the slowness of the courts to adopt the declaration against penal interest exception was the concern that persons
would confess to save others from jeopardy' 2 Another reason was
the view that what appears to be a declaration against penal interest,
especially if the statement names another, may in fact be a statement
in favor of one's own interest and, thus, lacking in reliability. 4 The
declarant, especially when naming another, may "desire to shift or

6

See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (1)-(5); see also id. at 804(b) (1)-(5).

37 In addition to the requirement that the statement must be against
interest

and that the declarant be unavailable, the declarant must have had personal knowledge and understood the fact asserted. See 4 CHRusToPHE B. MuELLER & LAIRD C.
KrKPATRiC.K, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 496, at 813-14 (2d ed. 1994).
See, e.g., The Queen v. Overseers of Birmingham, 121 ENG. REP. 897 (KB.
1861); Higham v. Ridgway, 103 ENG. RaP. 717 (KB. 1808); Searle v. Lord Barrington, 93 ENG. REP. 875 (KB. 1725).
39 For a history of the development of the against-penal-interest
exception in
one state, see E. M. Morgan, DeclarationsAgainst Interest in Texas, 10 TEx. L. R v. 399
(1932). See also People v. Spriggs, 389 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1964); Sutter v. Easterly, 189
S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1945); Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Fairlawn, 62 N.J. Super. 522,
163 A.2d 465 (App. Div. 1960); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 61 S.E.2d 318 (Va.
1950).
'0 Fa. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's notes.
41 See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994); Laumer v. United
States, 409 A.2d 190, 201-03 (D.C. 1979) (en banc).
42 See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273-74 (1913).
This concern is
expressed in the Rule 804(b)(3) requirement that statements exculpating the accused not be admitted "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (3).
43 See, e.g., Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 243.

1997]

STA TMENTS AGAINST NTERST

4477

spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another.""
Even if the statement 5 fits the exception as being against interest, there remains the question of whether the entire statement or
only a portion of it should be admitted. Furthermore, if only a portion should be admitted, what portion should be included? Assuming the statement would otherwise be entitled to be admitted, those
portions of the statement that are against pecuniary or proprietary
interest or subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability should be
admitted. At the other extreme, those portions that are self-serving
should not be admitted; they are in favor of the declarant's interest
and do not fit the most basic requirement of the rule.' For example,
a statement might acknowledge an individual's participation in a
criminal act but include a statement naming another as primarily responsible for the crime. The portion placing primary responsibility
on another would not be against interest and, in fact, would be selfserving.
The troubling issue for admission, and the one on which commentators4 7 and courts" differ, is whether collateral or related por-

tions of the statement that are neutral as to interest should be admitted. An example would be the non-self-inculpatory portion of a
statement about a transaction involving two persons, such as a drug
sale, by one of the parties to the transaction.4 In discussing such
statements, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 804, Exception
(3), seems to pave the way for the introduction of such a statement
under the rule. The committee's note provides that "[o]rdinarily
the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the

4 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).

The word statement is used here to describe the entire narrative and not, as
the Supreme Court found in Wi/iamson, only those portions of the statement that
are against interest. See Wiliamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
46 See 4 MuKLLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 816-17.
47 See CHARIus T. MCCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 256, at 552-53 (1954); see also
5 JOHN WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1465, at 271 (3d ed. 1940); Bernard S. Jefferson, Decarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARv. L. REV. 1, 62-63
(1944).
Compare United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1980) and
United States v. Carris, 616 F.2d 626, 629-33 (2d Cir. 1980) with United States v.
Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1978).
One example is a statement about an action taken by two persons made by
one of the participants and naming the other. See 4 MuEaLT & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 37, at 833 & n.6 (citing United States v. Bakhtiar, 994 F.2d 970, 977 (2d Cir.
1993)). Other examples are statements made by co-conspirators that show insider
information by naming others also involved. See id. at 835.
45
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accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may
include statements implicating him, and under the general theory of
declarations against interest they would be admissible as related
statements." ' Of course, it seems most appropriate that portions of
the statement that are closely related to the self-inculpatory part
should be admitted but the portions much attenuated in time, narrative, or meaning should not. In United States v. Garris,5' the court
reasoned that those portions of the statement that are "integral"52 to
the parts of the statement that are against interest should be admitted." "[T]he court seemed to mean two things: The fact adverse to
the defendant and the fact adverse to the speaker had a close logical
connection in appraising the speaker's conduct, and the speaker
closely connected her description of both facts in her statement
(close narrative connection)."
Before Williamson, the weight of authority held that the appropriate test for deciding whether neutral portions of a statement
should be admitted was whether there was a close connection between the against-interest segments and the related neutral or collateral portions of the statement. This proximity lent trustworthiness
to the neutral portions of the statement. In discussing "contextual"
or related statements, McCormick suggests that "to admit the critical
related statement or part of the statement is acceptable, even though
not itself against interest, if it is closely enough connected and neutral as to interest." In a civil action, apart from issues such as unfair
prejudice under F.RE. 403,5' the general analysis to decide whether a
IO FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's notes (emphasis added).

51 616 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1980).

Id. at 630.
See id. at 629-33. In Garris, four men robbed a bank and three of them were
photographed by the bank's surveillance camera. See id. at 627-28. At trial, the government adduced evidence that Benjamin Garris was the fourth robber. See id. at
52

628. To corroborate the testimony of the principal witness against Garris, the government sought to introduce statements implicating Garris made by Garris's sister
to an FBI agent. See id. Those statements not only implicated Garris in the robbery,
but they also implicated Garris's sister in another robbery. See id. at 629. At the
trial, his sister did not recall making the statements; the court found that her lack of
memory made her an unavailable witness and allowed the agent to testify to the
statements under Rule 804(b) (3)--the "penal interest" exception to the hearsay
rule. See id.
54 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATMCK, supranote
37, at 832.
See infta notes 155-162 and accompanying text.
CHARLE-s T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§ 319, at 531 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
57 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
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statement against interest should be admitted would end at this
point. Of course, in a criminal case, the judge would also need to
decide whether the admission of the statement would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.
Modem Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis is
based on the case of Ohio v. Roberts." In Roberts, the Supreme Court
set out a two-prong Confrontation Clause test for determining the
admissibility of hearsay. "When a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability." 59
Roberts also held that no inquiry into reliability is needed when
the evidence "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."60 Because the Court has found so many exceptions to be firmly rooted,
the reliability analysis set out in Roberts now is used for only a few major exceptions. In Roberts, the Court stated that the business records
exception, public records exception, and former testimony exception are all "firmly rooted."6 At this point, "firmly rooted" exceptions also include dying declarations, 2 the co-conspirator excep6
tion,r' excited utterances," and statements for medical purposes. "
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether the statement against interest exception is "firmly rooted."'
For several reasons, the Court is unlikely to find the statement
against interest exception to be "firmly rooted." First, in Williamson
the Court struggled to decide the case on a ground that would avoid
the Confrontation Clause issues. 7 Having recently ducked the constitutional issue, the Court is unlikely to revisit it in the near future.
Second, the inclusion within the exception of statements against penal interest is a relatively recent development" and this weighs
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 408.
5
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
59 Id. at 66.
'W

Id.

Id.; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-68 (1970) (preliminary
hearing testimony); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (prior trial testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (first trial testimony).
See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 250.
63 SeeBourjailyv. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 183-84 (1987).
SeeWhite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
6
See id. at 355-56 & n.8.
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994).
67 Se infa notes 244-246 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying text.
61
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against a finding that the exception is "firmly rooted." Third, "use of
the exception to admit against-interest statements by third parties
implicating... the defendant was not entirely expected and represents a new departure raising some concern. In this setting, individualized constitutional scrutiny of uses of the exception should
continue to be required . . ."69 For these reasons, statements against
interest will continue to be analyzed under the reliability standard
required by Roberts. Since Roberts, the Court has defined the reliability standard for the admission of hearsay statements under nonfirmly rooted exceptions in a series of cases including Lee v. Illinois,70
Cruz v. New York," and Idaho v. Wright."
In Lee, Lee and her boyfriend, Thomas, were tried and convicted for a double murder.73 Police officers had asked Lee to identify the body of her deceased aunt. 74 She then was given a Miranda
warning and confessed to the murder of her aunt and her aunt's
friend."5 After being told that Lee had confessed, Thomas also confessed. 7' His confession, unlike Lee's, implicated Lee in a premeditated murder.77 The Supreme Court held "that Thomas' statement,
as the confession of an accomplice, was presumptively unreliable and
that it did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia of reliability' to
overcome that presumption." 78 The Court reasoned:
[T]he circumstances surrounding the confession do not rebut
the presumption that Thomas' statement could not be trusted as
regards Lee's participation in the murders. When Thomas was
taken in for questioning and read his rights he refused to talk to
the police. The confession was elicited only after Thomas was
694
70
71

MuE.

& KIRKATRICK, supra note 37, at 151.

476 U.S 530 (1986).
481 U.S. 186 (1987).

" 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Another important case dealing with confrontation is
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Bruton, however, provides little guidance on when a statement against interest should be admitted. In Bruton, the Court
held that a jury instruction not to consider an improperly admitted codefendant's
confession was insufficient to overcome the admissibility error. When Bruton was
decided, no hearsay exception existed under which the codefendant's confession
could have been admitted against Bruton. Thus, earlier in Bruton, the Eighth Circuit had set aside the codefendant's conviction on the ground that the confession
should not have been admitted against him but had affirmed Bruton's conviction
because of the instruction. See id. at 124-25.
73See Lee, 476 U.S. at
531.
74

7
76

"
78

See id. at 532.
See id.
See id. at 533.
See id. at 535.

Id. at 539.
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told that Lee had already implicated him and only after he was
implored by Lee to share "the rap" with her. The unsworn
statement was given in response to the questions of police, who,
having already interrogated Lee, no doubt knew what they were
looking for ....
[Although] the confession was found to be voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes, such a finding does not
bear on the question of whether the confession was also free
from any desire, motive, or impulse Thomas may have had either
to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading
the blame or to overstate Lee's involvement in retaliation for her
having implicated him in the murders.
The Court concluded that it was "not convinced that there exist[ed] sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' flowing from either the circumstances surrounding the confession or the 'interlocking' charac-

ter of the confessions, to overcome the weighty presumption against
the admission of such uncross-examined evidence."80 The Court
overturned Lee's conviction but remanded the case to the trial court
on the issue of whether the error was harmless.8'
In Cruz v. New York, two brothers, Eulogio Cruz, the petitioner,
and Benjamin Cruz, were tried for felony murder.8 Benjamin, who
did not take the stand, made a videotaped confession to the police
that was introduced at trial.8 The prosecution also introduced testimony from the victim's brother, who claimed that Eulogio had confided his involvement in the felony murder." Eulogio's attorney argued to the jury that the victim's brother, who suspected Eulogio
and Benjamin of killing his brother, had fabricated the testimony to
gain revenge." In reversing and remanding the case, the Supreme
Court held:
Where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating
the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, see
Lee v. Illinois, supra, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission
at theirjoint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it
against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him. Of course, the defendant's confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant's
statements are supported by sufficient "indiciaof reliability" to be directly

Lee, 476 U.S. at 544.
so Id. at 546.
8 See id. at 547.
79

8
8

See Cruz v. NewYork, 481 U.S. 186, 189 (1987).
See id. at 188-89
See id. at 189.

85 Sid.

482
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admissible against him (assuming the "unavailability" of the codefendant) despite the lack of opportunityfor cross-examination,and may be
considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation
Clause violation was harmless.8
The expression in both Lee and Cruz that a court might look to
an "interlocking confession"-one by the defendant that squares
with the declarant's confession-in deciding for Confrontation
Clause purposes the reliability and admissibility of a declarant's confession was dashed in Idaho v. Wright." Although many of the facts of
Wright are not important to a discussion of statements against interest," its holding is highly relevant. In Wright, the State sought to use
physical evidence to bolster the reliability of a two-year old's hearsay
statement about sexual abuse in order to get the statement admitted." The Court found that "unless an affirmative reason, arising
from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis
for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy
of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of
the out-of-court statement."90 The Court went on to say[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a
result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that
9 cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal
utility. 1
In sum, to withstand Confrontation Clause analysis, a statement
against interest must have sufficient "indicia of reliability," and these
indications must come from "the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement. " 9 The rationale is that these in-

86

Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

497 U.S 805 (1990).
a In Wright, the Court was faced with whether a hearsay statement of sexual
abuse made by a two-year old should have been admitted. See id. at 808. The child
had been asked leading questions, and the Supreme Court of Idaho found that the
"interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived idea of what the
child should be disclosing." Id. at 813 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224,
1227 (Idaho 1989)).
a See id. at 809-12.
90 Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 823.
92 Id. at
820.
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dications of reliability would make the evidence "so trustworthy that
adversarial testing would add little to their reliability."5
III. THE VARIATIONS OF RELIABLrITY
The concept of reliability is at the forefront when one assesses
hearsay exceptions and a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights." Courts may list a number of factors that can be
used in assessing reliability, but they are often quite inarticulate
about the standard to be used in making this determination. In addition, courts often fail to articulate the stages of analysis and how
the reliability standard varies depending upon the task at hand.
In statement against interest analysis in the criminal law context, there are three forms of reliability and varying standards for applying each. A knowledge of these forms is important in understanding the law in this area and the Wiiamson case. First, there is the
standard for reliability that is to be applied in establishing an exception.f This standard, "exception reliability," requires that the type of
statement have some general underpinning of reliability in logic and
human experience. For example, in the case of a statement against
interest, persons are unlikely to say things against their interest unless they are true.
Once an exception is established, individual statements have to
be tested to see if they fit the requirements of the exception and
thus have sufficient reliability to be admissible. This form of reliability, "admission reliability," involves a specific application of reliability
in the case being tried or decided on appeal.97
In a criminal case, a third form of reliability analysis is required
because of the application of Confrontation Clause principles to the
potential introduction of evidence that cannot be cross-examined. 9
93 Wright, 497 U.S at 821.

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913).
See Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 1954). "(O)ur
holding is supported.., by the absence here of the rational justification which obtains in every recognized exception to the hearsay rule; that is, a circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness .... " Id.
96 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's notes. "The circumstantial
guaranty of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for
good reason that they are true." Id. (citing Hileman v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 346
F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965)).
97 For a discussion of admission reliability, see infra notes 193-198
and accompanying text.
See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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As is discussed later, "indicia of reliability" or "Confrontation Clause
reliability" requires a higher standard of reliability analysis than
"admission reliability."m A major subpart of "Confrontation Clause
reliability" is "firmly rooted exception reliability." "No independent
inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence 'falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. ' " '°°
IV. THE DECISION IN WILLIAMSON
The decision in Williamson, like so many recent decisions of the
Court, is composed of a number of opinions. There is the majority
opinion written by Justice O'Connor; a concurrence by Justice Scalia;
a concurrence in part by Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter; and a concurrence in the judgment by
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. In
the words of one commentator, the decision is "a complete
0
mess." '
A. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
In part I of the decision, Justice O'Connor set out the facts." A
police officer's traffic stop of Reginald Harris for weaving led to Williamson's prosecution.'O After the stop, Harris consented to a search
of the rental car, and the officer found two suitcases containing cocaine.1M
Harris was arrested and later questioned over the telephone by a
DEA agent.105 Harris told the agent that he got the cocaine from a
Cuban, that Williamson was the owner, and that he was to deliver the
cocaine to a dumpster." Physical evidence from the car also tied
Williamson to Harris.' 7 The luggage had Williamson's sister's iniFor a discussion of the higher standard for Confrontation Clause reliability,
see infranotes 191-206 and accompanying text.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56,66 (1980)).
101 Eileen A. Scallen, ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning and the Law of Evidence,
44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717, 1795 (1995). Professor Welsh White was somewhat more
charitable in describing the decision as "cryptic," with "some of the majority's critical language [ I subject to widely different interpretations." Welsh S. White, Accomplices' Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 762
(1996).
102 See Williamson v. United States, 512
U.S. 594, 596-97 (1994).
103 See
104

id. at 596.

See id.

1o5See id.
Se id.
107 See
id.
106
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tials, the rental agreement listed Williamson as a driver, and the
glove compartment contained a receipt that had Williamson's girlfriend's address on it and an envelope that was addressed to William108
son.
Following the telephone interview, the DEA agent interviewed
Harris in person, and Harris told him that "he had rented the car a
few days earlier and had driven it to Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson."1 °9 There, a Cuban who knew Williamson "put the cocaine
in the car with a note telling Harris how to deliver the drugs."" ° The
agent began arranging for "a controlled delivery of the cocaine.""'
Harris stopped him by saying, "I can't let you do that.., that's not
true, I can't let you go up there for no reason.""' Harris then explained that he had been transporting the drugs to Atlanta for Williamson, and that Williamson, traveling in another car, had seen
Harris's car with the trunk open following the stop."' Because of
this, Harris said an attempt at delivery would be futile."4 Harris told
the agent that he had made up the earlier story because he feared
5
Williamson."
At Williamson's trial, Harris refused to testify despite a grant of
immunity, a court order to do so, and a finding of contempt for failure to obey the order. The trial court allowed the DEA agent to testify to what he had been
told by Harris. Williamson was convicted of
6
several drug charges."

In reviewing the conviction in part II-A of the decision, Justice
O'Connor started the analysis by setting out the hazards of hearsay
testimony" and describing the ways in which these dangers are reduced with in-court statements." 8 Noting that exceptions exist to the
general prohibition on admitting hearsay and that one exception is
108 See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 596.
109

Id.

110 Id.
"'I

Id.

"1

Id. at 597.

11"See id.

See Wiliamson, 512 U.S. at 597.
115See id.
116See id. at 597-98.
117See id. at 598. "The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived
the
events which he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by the listener." Id.
1
When a witness testifies in court, the hearsay dangers are reduced by "the
oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury's ability to
observe the witness' demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to
cross-examine...." Id.
1
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for statements against interest, Justice O'Connor explained that the
Court first had to determine the meaning of the term "statement" in
Rule 804(b)(3). The Court could have looked to precedent, to the
Advisory Committee Notes to the rule, or to various commentators,
butJustice O'Connor first turned to Webster's Third New International
Dictionary. There, the Justice found two definitions of statement:
One is "a report or narrative" and the other is "a single declaration
or remark."' ' Justice O'Connor then noted that the "principle behind the rule" is that "reasonable people, even reasonable people
who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory
statements unless they believe them to be true."'2 2 The Justice argued that "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood
with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because
of its self-inculpatory nature.
Using this as a basis, Justice
O'Connor argued that the notion that people do not make selfinculpatory statements unless they are true does not extend to the
broader definition of statement-that is, a report or narrative and
not a single declaration or remark.'22 The Justice found additional
support for this view because the non-self-inculpatory remarks that
Harris made in his first statement proved to be false.
Justice O'Connor then criticized the view expressed in Justice
Kennedy's dissent. Justice Kennedy concluded that comments that
are collateral to the against-interest statement and neutral as to interest should be admissible as part of the exception.'
AlthoughJustice O'Connor explicitly refused to suggest how much weight should
be given to the Advisory Committee Notes, the Justice did conclude
that the language in the note to Rule 804(b)(3) is not particularly
clear, 24 but that the policy of the rule pulls so clearly "in22one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes may have."'
In part II-B of the decision, Justice O'Connor tried to rebutJustice Kennedy's view that the decision eviscerates the against penal in119

Id.

(1961)).

at 599 (quoting WEaBsT's THIRD NEW INTErATnIONAL DiCTONARY 2229

Ito Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
1
Id. at 599-600.
122 Seeid. at 599.
123 See id. at 618-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12 The Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 804(b) (3) provides in part:
"Ordinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements." FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory
committee's notes (emphasis added).
125 Williamson, 512 U.S.
at 602.
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terest exception. Justice O'Connor provided examples of statements
against interest that might be admissible and then reasoned that
courts must view statements in context to decide whether they are
admissible.
In part II-C, Justice O'Connor concluded that portions of Harris's statement were admissible but that the case should be remanded to the court of appeals for inquiry as to "whether each of
the statements in Harris's confession was truly self-inculpatory." 26
Justice O'Connor ended the decision with a list of issues the Court
did not decide.'" These included whether the admission of Harris's
statements would violate the Confrontation Clause and, despite conflicting circuit court decisions, whether the declaration against interest exception is firmly rooted. 128 In addition, the Court refused to
decide whether statements inculpating the accused must be supported by corroborating circumstances, since Rule 804(b)(3) requires that statements exculpating the accused not be admitted
"unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. '2
B. Justice Scalia's Opinion

Justice Scalia fully concurred injustice O'Connor's opinion but
wrote separately, in part it appears, to take a fewjabs atJustice Kennedy's opinion. Justice Scalia made three main points. First, the
Justice stated that "[e]mploying the narrower definition of
'statement,' so that Rule 804(b) (3) allows admission of only those
remarks that are individually self-inculpatory, does not, as Justice
Kennedy states, 'eviscerate the against penal interest exception. ' "' -"
To support this view, Justice Scalia set out a few examples of statements that may be self-inculpatory without being direct confessions.
Second, the Justice reasoned that a statement against penal interest
may be admissible even if it "names another person or implicates a
possible codefendant."'-" Third, Justice Scalia concluded his concurrence by denigrating the classifications of collateral statements used
by Justice Kennedy. "The relevant inquiry, however-and one that is
126 Id. at 604.
12
128

Se id. at 605.
See id. (citing United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-76 (5th Cir. 1993)

(holding that it is not a firmly rooted exception); United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d
1, 2 (lst Cir. 1989) (holding that it is a firmly rooted exception)).
1
Id.; see alsoFED. R. Evm. 804(b) (3).
30 Witiamson, 512 U.S. at 606 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
131

_,
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not furthered by clouding the waters with manufactured categories
such as 'collateral neutral' and 'collateral self-serving,'-must always
be whether the particular remark at issue (and not the extended narrative) meets the standard set forth in the Rule."
C. Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ginsburg concurred in parts I, II-A, and I1-B of the
Court's opinion. Justice Ginsburg began by agreeing with the
Court's view that "the exception for statements against penal interest
'does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory .... '"" Justice Ginsburg then discussed the lack of
trustworthiness in statements implicating another and quoted from
the decisions in Lee v. Illinois'N and Bruton v. United States.'" Justice
Ginsburg departed from the Court's decision in finding that no part
of Harris's statements to the DEA agent fit within Rule 804(b) (3) because his "arguably inculpatory statements [were] too closely intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be ranked as trustworthy.""
The Justice suggested that Harris's statements painted
Williamson as the "big fish" and admitted his own involvement in a
way that minimized his own role. Justice Ginsburg concluded by stating that because she had not reviewed the entire record, she would
not foreclose the prosecution from arguing that admitting Harris's
statements was harmless error." 7
D. Justice Kennedy's Opinion
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
the majority's reasoning in almost every way. After setting out that
hearsay is generally inadmissible but that many exceptions exist, the
Justice defined the issue before the Court as whether collateral
statements are admissible under F.RE. 804(b) (3).
Noting that there has been long debate on this issue, Justice
Kennedy highlighted the positions of three commentators. First, the
Justice cited to Dean Wigmore, who argued that "'the statement may
be accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against interest, but

Id. at 607 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Id. at 608 (Ginsburg,J., concurring) (quoting id. at 600).
IN 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
3391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White,J., dissenting).
1M Wi!iamson, 512 U.S. at 608 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
1
See id. at 610-11 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
1

Iss
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also as to every fact contained in the same statement.'"'13 Justice
Kennedy then cited Dean McCormick, who "argued for the admissibility of collateral statements of a neutral character, and for the exclusion of collateral statements of a self-serving character."' 9 Justice
Kennedy concluded his discussion of the commentators with a reference to Bernard Jefferson: "Professor Jefferson took the narrowest
approach, arguing that the reliability of a statement against interest
stems only from the disserving fact stated and so should be confined
'to the proof of the fact which is against interest.'"'°
Justice Kennedy then stated that the text of the rule does not
contain the answer as to whether collateral statements are admissible. This view conflicted with the majority, who found that the policy
expressed in the text prohibited the introduction of collateral statements. 4 ' BecauseJustice Kennedy did not find an answer in the text,
the Justice looked to other sources.
In part II, Justice Kennedy looked to the Advisory Committee
Note and found:
[It] establishes that some collateral statements are admissible. In
fact, it refers in specific terms to the issue we here confront:
"Ordinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of
exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him, and
under the general theory of declarations 2against interest they
would be admissible as related statements."
After discussing the Advisory Committee Note, Justice Kennedy
argued that the common law allowed for the admission of collateral
statements, and that, by failing to express a change, "Congress intended the principles and terms used in the Federal Rules of Evidence to be applied as they were at common law." 45 Next, the Justice
argued that collateral statements should be introduced because precluding their admission would severely limit the statement against
penal interest exception. Justice Kennedy argued that Congress
could not have intended the rule to have so little effect. The Justice
pointed out that the effect of the Court's decision would be to limit

s Id. at 611-12 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (quoting 5

WIGMORE, supra note 47, at

339).
Id. (quoting McCoRmi[c, supranote 47, at 552-53).

140 Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Jefferson, supra note 47, at 62-

63).
14
1

1

See id. at 600.

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 614 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
Id. at 615 (Kennedy,J., concurring).

490

SETON HALL LA WJREVIEW

[Vol. 28:471

severely not only the introduction of statements that inculpate the
accused but also those that exculpate.'
In part III, Justice Kennedy addressed the question of which collateral statements should be admitted. justice Kennedy took the position that the reference to McCormick in the Advisory Committee's
Note on the balancing of self-serving versus disserving portions of
the declaration was an incorporation of McCormick's view.
"McCormick stated that '[a] certain latitude as to contextual [i.e.,
collateral] statements, neutral as to interest, giving meaning to the
declaration against interest seems defensible, but bringing
in self" 14
serving statements contextually seems questionable. 5
Justice Kennedy then suggested that statements that are selfserving in the criminal context are ones that would reduce the
charges against or mitigate the punishment of the declarant. The
Justice found that statements made to authorities may be an attempt
to curry favor and that both the collateral comments and the statement that appears to be against interest may need to be excluded.'"
Justice Kennedy noted that because the declarant is unavailable,
courts have created categories for the exclusion of such statements." 7
Justice Kennedy then suggested an approach for dealing with
the statement against interest exception. Initially, a court should determine if the statement contains a fact against interest. If it does,
the court should admit all statements related to that statement
against interest with two limitations. First, the court should exclude
collateral statements that are so self-serving as to be unreliable. Second, the court should exclude the entire statement where "the declarant had a significant motivation to obtain favorable treatment, as
when the government made an explicit offer of leniency in exchange
for the declarant's admission of guilt."'" Justice Kennedy concluded
that the case should be remanded "for application of the analysis set
forth in this opinion" because decisions on statements against interest involve fact-bound judgments.'
Although the basic holding of
Williamson seems relatively clear, "some of the majority's critical lan-

1
145

552).

See id. at 617 (KennedyJ, concurring).
Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCoRMIcjK, supra note 47, at

146
See id. at 618-19 (KennedyJ., concurring). For a discussion of why an accomplice's confession resulting from formal police interrogation should not be introduced against an accused, see generally White, supra note 101.
147 See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 619 (KennedyJ, concurring).
148 Id. at 620 (KennedyJ, concurring).
149 Id. at 621 (KennedyJ, concurring).
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guage is subject to widely different interpretations"'50 and one is left
wondering how courts will apply the decision.
V.

THE CONST1TUTIONALIZATION OF RULE 804(b) (3)

As mentioned earlier, one thesis of this article is that the Supreme Court in Williamson, by limiting the admission of statements
against interest to only those portions of a declaration that are
against the declarant's interest, has constitutionalized Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b) (3)."" This section of the article discusses that
thesis. First, this section reviews the common law on statements
against interest and the breadth that courts have given to the admission of statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3). Second,
this section discusses the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as it applies to the statement against interest exception." Third, the section shows how allowing the admission of only self-inculpatory portions of a
declaration presses a new and higher admission standard for statements against interest than earlier precedent. This results in an incorporation of the Sixth Amendment standard and virtually eliminates the need for Confrontation Clause analysis.
The notion that the Supreme Court has constitutionalized Rule
804(b) (3) is somewhat slippery because both statement against interest admissibility and Confrontation Clause analysis focus on reliability. Although other interests perhaps should be major forces in
Confrontation Clause analysis,5 3 I have focused on reliability because
the Supreme Court has made the reliability of the statement of an
unavailable declarant the key admissibility issue under its Confrontation Clause analysis."" The constitutionalization argument is also
less facile because courts often fail to distinguish between the statement against interest exception and Confrontation Clause analysis.
:
2
151

White, supranote 101, at 762.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
This discussion assumes that the Supreme Court will not find the statement

against interest exception to be a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. See
supranotes 66-69 and accompanying text.
,. See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposalfor a ProsecutorialRestraint Mode 76 MINN. L. REv. 557 (1992);
Roger W. Kirst, The ProceduralDimension of ConfrontationDoctrine,66 NEB. L. REv. 485
(1987); Scallen, supranote 101.
IN See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). The Court in White held that a
hearsay statement may be admitted if it is reliable because of "substantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" or because of a "firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 355-57;
see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUEL.ER & LAIRD C. KiRKPATRiCK, EVIDENCE § 8.75, at 1097
(3d ed. 1995).
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In addition, courts are often inarticulate about the standard of reliability being used.
A.

The Common Law on Statements Against Interest and the PreWilliamson Interpretationof Rule 804(b)(3).

Because the Federal Rules of Evidence made few changes to the
common law, 5 it is helpful to examine the common law on the admission of statements against interest and the introduction of portions of a statement that are not against interest. Very early on,
statements against interest were introduced despite that some portions might be considered neutral as to interest and even selfserving." The view that the "collateral statements connected with
the disserving statements" were admissible at common law was even
acknowledged by ProfessorJefferson, one of the strong opponents to
their introduction.' 7 Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Rule 804(b) (3), many federal courts adopted the view
taken by the common law on collateral statements. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Garris,'" found that "it suffices for admission
under that rule that a remark which is itself neutral as to the declarant's interest be integral to a larger statement which is against the
declarant's interest."' The notion that neutral collateral statements
may be admitted as part of a statement against interest if they are
sufficiendy "integral" or "connected" to the against interest portion
permeates the case law dealing with collateral comments. In United
4" the First Circuit admitted collateral comments that
States v. Barrett,
added to the statement's against interest aspect. The court said that
it did not "appear that Congress intended to constrict the scope of a
declaration against interest to the point of excluding 'collateral' material that, as here, actually tended to fortify the statement's disserving aspects. "'' Of course, if what at first appears to be neutral actu15" See David P. Leonard, Foreword: Twenty Years of the FederalRules of Evidence, 28

Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (1995); see also Faust S. Rossi, The FederalRules of Evidence-Past,Present and Future: A Twenty Year rospective, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1271,
1272 (1995).
6 See Higham v. Ridgway, 103 ENG. REP. 717, 721 (KB. 1808); see also
5 WiGMORE, supranote 47, at 271.

SeeJefferson, supranote 47, at 62-63.

15 616 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1980).
159
160
161

Id. at 630.
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 252; see also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1172 (2d Cir.

1989) (admitting references to others in statement where the reference was closely
connected to the reference to the declarant); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d
95, 103 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that even a wholly neutral portion of a declaration
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ally is62 self-serving, that portion would not, and should not, be admitted.
Before Williamson, some authority was read to exclude statements that were collateral to statements against interest."6 In one
such case, United States v. Lilley,'" the court was faced with the issue of
admitting a husband's confession to his involvement in cashing a tax
refund check that also placed much of the guilt on the appellant, his
wife. In deciding to admit only those portions of the statement that
were actually against interest, if severable, the court stated that "all
portions of Mr. Lilley's statement which were not against his interest
should have been excluded from evidence because they lacked the
indicia of truthfulness associated with Rule 804(b) (3)."'65 The court,
however, found that "for the most part his statement was inculpatory
of appellant and not against Mr. Lilley's interest."' Although Lilley
may be in line with Wiliamson, it might be read as a case simply confirming the need for a statement to be against interest and excluding
statements that shift blame. Lilley did not directly address whether,
before Wiliamson, case law allowed the admission of related portions
of statements against interest.
United States v. Porter167 is another case that has been read as prohibiting the introduction of collateral statements of a neutral character as part of a statement against interest,'" and the general language
and holding in fact support this notion. 69 The statement at issue in
might be admitted if "itwas part and parcel of a larger conversation in which clearly
self-incriminating statements were made").
162 See United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Whether a statement is in fact against interest depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. We are mindful of the Advisory
Committee's warning that an in-custody statement which inculpates
another as well as the speaker may have been made with a view to currying favor with law-enforcement authorities, and consequently might
not qualify as a declaration against penal interest.
Id. (citing FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note).
165 See Keith M. Aurzada, Case Note, Evidence--Rule 804(b)(3): The Williamson
Decision Establishes a Bright-Line Rule That Invites Injustice and Crippies the Hearsay Exception For Statements Against Penal Interest, Williamson v. United States, 30 LAND &
WATFR L. REv. 591, 597-98 (1995) (arguing that United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182
(8th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Porter,881 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1989), held that
remarks collateral to statements against interest are not admissible).
16
581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
16

Id. at 188.
Id. at 187.

167

881 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1989).

165

1W See Aurzada, supra note 163, at 597-98.

See Porter, 881 F.2d at 883. "Thus, to the extent that a statement not against
the declarant's interest is severable from other statements satisfying 804(b) (3), such
169
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Porter, however, was one exculpating the accused (Danny Porter) and
was made by the defendant's brother (Dick), deceased at the time of
trial, to the defendant's sister-in-law. One of the grounds for the decision was that "there is the need for corroborating circumstances
that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of Dick's statement exculpating Danny... [and] the district court's apparent finding of insufficient corroboration is not without support in the record." 7 One
wonders if the holding and general language of Porter would have
been the same if a less biased witness, a living declarant, and an inculpatory statement had been involved.
Although some pre-Williamson authority supports the exclusion
of collateral statements, the great weight of federal authority has
read Rule 804(b) (3) as allowing the introduction of collateral statements."' In addition, many states that have adopted the Federal
Rules of Evidence or their own variations also allow for the introduction of collateral statements.'7 2 States without
codified evidence rules
7'
have also admitted collateral statements.1
B. The Difference Between the ProhibitionAgainst Hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause
Although both the prohibition against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause have similar antecedents 74 and protect similar values, they are different in both substance and application. In California v. Green, 7 Justice White wrote for the Court:

statement should be excluded." Id.
110Id.
1
This point and this article focus on inculpatory statements against interest.
Because of the corroboration requirement, the admissibility of exculpatory statements is often treated quite differently. See Fa. R. Evm. 804(b) (3).
172 See also State v. Kiewert, 605 A.2d 1031, 1035-36 (N.H. 1992);
State v. Parris,
654 P.2d 77, 81 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). See generalyJulianna Gortner, Note, The
Admissibility of Inculpatory Statements in Washington under the Rule for Declarations
Against Interest AfterWilliamson v. United States, 70 WASH. L. Rav. 859 (1995).
171SSee Maryland v. Standifur, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (Md. 1987).
"A statement
against interest that survives this analysis, and those related statements so closely
connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against
interest." Id. (emphasis added).
17
The rule against hearsay testimony and the Confrontation Clause may both
trace their roots to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, whose conviction was based on
out of court statements attributed to Lord Cobham. For a brief account of the trial
of Sir Walter Raleigh, see Californiav. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970). For an
historical discussion of the origins of the Confrontation Clause, see id. at 174-83
(Harlan,J., concurring).
175 399 U.S. 149 (1970).

1997]

STA TEMENTS A GAINST INTEREST

While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,
it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete
and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once
found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hear176
say exception.
The Court affirmed this view in Dutton v. Evans,177 when it
quoted the above excerpt from Green and iterated the view in a terser
fashion: "It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same
roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to
do so now." 178 The Court reinforced the position by quoting approvingly a commentator who wrote that, "[d]espite the superficial similarity between the evidentiary rule and the constitutional clause, the
Court should not be eager to equate them. Present hearsay law does
not merit a permanent niche in the Constitution; indeed, its ripeness for reform is a unifying theme of evidence literature."79 In a
concurrence in Dutton,Justice Harlan, quoting Wigmore, suggested
that the major difference between the rules of evidence and the
Confrontation Clause is that the rules dictate the substantive form of
evidence that may be admitted while the Confrontation Clause sets
forth the process:
The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial
statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infrajudicially--this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being,--but only what mode of procedure shall be followed-i.e, a
cross-examining procedure--in the case of such testimony as is
required M
by the ordinary law of Evidence to be given infrajudicially.
Professor Andrew Keller pointed out the difference in a similar way.

176 Id. at 155-56 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965)).
M 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
178 Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted).
179

Id. at n.17 (quoting Note, Confrontationand the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434,

1436 (1966)).
IO Id. at 94 (Harlan,J., concurring) (quoting WICMomz, supra note 47, § 1397, at
131) (footnote omitted).
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[T]he fact that the confrontation clause appears in the sixth
amendment of the Bill of Rights demonstrates that it is not simply
a rule of trial procedure-as is the hearsay rule-but "a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution. " ' S'
Later, "[h]aving equated confrontation with the right to crossexamination and defined the right instrumentally," 18 in Lee v. Illinois,'" the Supreme Court concluded that the right to cross-examine
may be satisfied if there is a showing that the hearsay statement is
sufficiently reliable.'"
Given the Court's pronouncements in Dutton and Green, the
confrontation right and hearsay rule are different. Although this difference has been limited by the firmly rooted exception analysis,'85
standard reliability analysis is used for the catchall exceptions'" and
will continue to be used for statements against interest.'o Because
the Supreme Court has focused its confrontation analysis on reliability, the standard for the introduction of statements against interest
and the standard for excusing confrontation seem to merge. But,
pre-Williamson, the standards were different for the introduction of
statements against interest and for not enforcing confrontation.
One may find support for the differing standards in a number
of places. First, the history of the adoption of Rule 804(b) (3) shows
that the drafters had no intention of imbuing the rule with the constitutional confrontation standard. During the drafting of Rule 804:
The House amended this exception to add a sentence making inadmissible a statement or confession offered against the accused
in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused. The sentence was added to
codify the constitutional principle announced in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) ....
The committee decided to delete this provision because the
basic approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to
codify, constitutional evidentiary principles such as the fifth
181 Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatory Statements Against PenalInterest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 159, 183-84 (1983) (footnote omitted).
Edward J. Ilnwinkelried, The Constitutionalizationof Hearsay: The Extent to
Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay

Rules, 76 MINN. L. REv. 521,525 (1992).
183 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
1
See id. at 540. "The right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses is primarily a functional right that promotes reliability in a criminal trial." Id.
5 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
186 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990); see also FFM. R. EvID.
803(24); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (5).
18 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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amendment's right against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment's right of confrontation.'
The sentence that limited the exception, and that was later
omitted, provided that the rule would not allow for the admission of
"a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal
case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused."'" Because of the elimination of that sentence
and from language of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, it is
clear that Rule 804(b) (3) was not intended to be co-extensive with
the Confrontation Clause. In fact, the intent was to steer clear of
codifying constitutional principles.' °
Second, in addition to the history of the rule showing the dichotomy between Rule 804(b) (3) and the Confrontation Clause, the
standards used in their application before Williamson show the differences between the two. While a declaration must be reliable to be
admitted as a statement against interest, and a statement against interest must be reliable to be admitted in contravention of the Confrontation Clause, the standards for reliability are different for each.
In Ohio v. Roberts,19' the Supreme Court said that an unavailable
declarant's "statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia
of reliability,'" and went on to say that, where no firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule applies, "the evidence must be excluded,
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'9 In contrast to the Confrontation Clause standard, reliability
for statements against interest "is founded on the commonplace notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless
they believe them to be true.""" The reliability standard for admission decisions was set out by the Court in Bourjaily v. United States.' 4
In Bourjaily, the Court confirmed that admissibility decisions that
198 FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) SenateJudiciary Committee Report.

Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969).
190 There was some confusion on the part of the drafters about the meaning
of
Bruton, but the intent to avoid constitutional issues is clear. For a further discussion
of Bruton, see supra note 72.
18

191 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
19

Id. at 66. (emphasis added). Factors that have been used by courts in finding

this level of reliability have included the motive to misrepresent, the speaker's general character, the timing of the statement, and whether the declaration was made
spontaneously. See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 702 & n.10 (5th Cir.
1978).
9 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).
19 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:471

hinge on preliminary factual questions must "be established by a
preponderance of proof."' Other courts have described the degree
of reliability that is required for the admission of a hearsay statement
as "unlikely to be false,"'" and as "a threshold test" of admissibility. 1 7
In the view of some, reliability may come from the mere fact that the
hearsay fits an exception. Judge Friendly stated:
[l1 t is doubtless true that all the hearsay exceptions in Rules 803
and 804 rest on a belief that declarations of the sort there described have "some particular assurance of credibility." But the
scheme of the Rules is to determine that issue by categories; if a
declaration comes within a category defined as an exception, the
declaration is admissible without any preliminary finding of
probable credibility by the judge, save for the "catch-all" exceptions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business records
exception of Rule 803(6) ("unless the source of information or
the method or circumstance of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness")."
The language used to describe the standards for admitting hearsay
leads to the conclusion that confrontation reliability creates a higher
standard than does exception reliability for hearsay exceptions that
are not firmly rooted.
Third, the sequence courts have used in analyzing cases in
which statement against interest and Confrontation Clause issues exist also supports the view that not only are confrontation reliability
and exception reliability different standards but also that confrontation reliability presents a higher standard. A case that makes this
point well is United States v. Coachman.'" In Coachman, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was faced with
the issue of whether "a Secret Service agent's recapitulation of an inculpatory statement" made by an alleged accomplice and naming
Coachman had been properly admitted. m0The court first looked to
the statement to see whether it fit the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule.2' Because the declarant "did not at-

195

1

Id.
People v. Spriggs, 389 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. 1964) (en banc); see also Jay L.

Hack, Note, DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an

Emygng Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. REv. 148, 154 (1976).
See State v. Higginbotham, 212 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1973); see also Hack,
suPranote 196, at 154 n.34.
United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
'" 727 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
200
201

Id. at 1296.
See id. at 1296-97.
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tempt to trivialize his own involvement in the nefarious scheme by
shifting responsibility to his cohorts"2 0 2 and because other evidence
corroborated the statement, the court found the statement to be a
declaration against interest and admissible under Rule 804(b) (3). 203
The court then analyzed whether the admission of the statement
"deprived Coachman of the benefit of the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment."m The court went on to find that the appellant's Confrontation Clause rights had been violated.205
In addition to precedential support for the proposition that
Confrontation Clause reliability generally represents a higher standard than exception reliability, commentators have also expressed
this view. For example, Professor Keller has written:
[W]hen a statement against penal interest is introduced as hearsay evidence against a defendant, its reliability must not only
meet the evidentiary requirements of the hearsay rule, but the
additional constitutional requirements mandated by the confrontation clause. Thus inculpatory hearsay statements are subject to
stricter admissibility standards than exculpatory hearsay statements.m
Pre-Williamson, it seems clear that the standard for admission
under the statement against interest exception was significantly
lower than for the Confrontation Clause. But, in Williamson, the Supreme Court adopted a standard for the admission of statements
against interest that was so stringent that it implicitly read Confrontation Clause requirements into the exception.
C. The Merger of Rule 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation Clause
Several indicators point to this conflation of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and the statement against interest exception.
M Id. at 1297.
203

Se id.

205

Id. (citing U.S. CONSr. amend. VI).
See Coachman, 727 F.2d at 1297. The court found the error to be harmless be-

cause of properly admitted evidence that it considered to be overwhelming. See id.
at 1297-98; see also State v. Matusky, 682 A.2d 694, 701, n.7 (Md. 1996).
Moreover, even if hearsay evidence satisfies the requirements of the
declaration against penal interest exception, it must also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
be admissible .... We have previously concluded that the declaration
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is not "firmly
rooted," and therefore, the proponent must demonstrate
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id.
Keller, supra note 181, at 184.
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First, the Court has. set a high standard for admission. Despite
common law precedent and numerous federal court interpretations
of Rule 804(b) (3) that allowed for the introduction of portions of a
statement that are "integral" or "connected" to the statement against
interest,2°7 the Williamson Court found that only the self-inculpatory
portions of statements against interest should be admissible. 28 This
standard presses upon the statement against interest exception an
admission threshold so high that only highly reliable statements will
be admitted. By their nature, statements against interest are reliable.2
Even before the Supreme Court's limited reading of Rule
804(b) (3), .many had expressed the view that statements against interest, including collateral portions, are so reliable that they should
be treated more favorably than other forms of hearsay for Confrontation Clause analysis. For example, "[t] he California Supreme Court
once championed the view that declarations against interest are so
trustworthy that there is no need for a showing of declarant unavailability."2 10 Several courts have found declarations against interest to
be so reliable as to be a "firmly rooted" exception
to the hearsay rule
21
and entitled to an inference of reliability. '
Given the high level of reliability for statements against interest,
especially when narrowly defined to exclude related comments, the
need for testing through cross-examination is dramatically decreased, if not obviated. It seems that testing through crossexamination might only marginally enhance the reliability of these
already highly trustworthy statements. Of course, the need for testing reliability through cross-examination is the hallmark of the
Court's reading of the right to confrontation.
This right may be
dispensed with where
"cross-examination
of
the
declarant
would be
23
of marginal utility."

Second, the merging of Confrontation Clause principles and
the statement against interest exception is shown by the likelihood
See supranotes 47-54 and accompanying text.
See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994).
See id. at 599. "[R]easonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe
them to be true." Id.
210 Imwinkelried, supra note 182, at 553 (citing People v. Spriggs,
389 P.2d 377,
381-82 (Cal. 1964)).
2
SeeJennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991); accordUnited
States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Seeley, 892
F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989).
212 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980).
213 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823 (1990).
207

208
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that far fewer declarations will be found to be statements against interest post-Williamson, and that these are likely to be only those that
have sufficient "indicia of reliability."" 4 An example of this likelihood is found in the post-Williamson case of Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc."5 In that civil action, the court was faced with deciding how much of an affidavit that was against the affiant's
(Woodend's) interest and named others should be admitted.2 6 Interpreting Williamson, the court took the view "that only those words
that are actually self-inculpatory fit within the Rule 804(b) (3) exception ....
[A]ny references in the Woodend affidavit to persons
other than Mr. Woodend would be inadmissible."217 Limited in this
way by the Ciccarelli court, the statement against interest exception
rises to the level of the "indicia of reliability" standard of the Confrontation Clause.
In fact, the Supreme Court's holding on statements against interest may more fully limit the admission of these declarations than
would the Confrontation Clause because "most statements inculpating a defendant are only collateral to the portion of the declarant's
statement that is against his own penal interest. The portion of the
statement that specifically implicates the 2defendant
is rarely directly
18
counter to the declarant's penal interest."
Third, the precedent relied on by the Court points to this conflation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the statement
against interest exception. After taking a textualist approach, citing
to Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary, and then taking a purposive approach-by asserting "that reasonable people.., tend not
to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be
true"2--Justice O'Connor cited not to statement against interest
precedent, but rather to the Court's Confrontation Clause cases.
TheJustice wrote that the courts
may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b) (3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession,
and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone
else. " [T]he arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally
been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation
214

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

115

862 F. Supp. 1293 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
e&id. at 1298.

21

217
18

Id.
Keller, supra note 181, at 163, cited in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S.

594, 616 (1994) (Kennedy,J, concurring).
2
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. For a discussion of the approaches followed
by
the Court, see Scallen, supranote 101, at 1795-1808.
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to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less
credible than ordinary hearsay evidence." m
After quoting from Lee, Justice O'Connor cited to Bruton v.
United States' and Dutton v. Evans, two other major cases in the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Likewise, Justice Ginsburg, in a concurrence, cited to Lee v. Illinois"5 and Bruton v. United
Statesr 4 in pointing to the lack of trustworthiness of in-custody statements that implicate another.2
Fourth, case law following Williamson points to the Court's conflation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and statement against
interest analysis. In United States v. Sasso,2" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with the issue of whether
an unavailable declarant's statements implicating Sasso had been
properly admitted under Rule 804(b) (3) and the Confrontation
Clause. m The prosecution alleged that Sasso had illegally arranged
for one Armienti to pick up weapons ordered by Sasso and deliver
payments for Sasso.2 8 At trial, Armienti's girlfriend, Kramer, testified
that Armienti told her that he was running guns for Sasso. M She
also testified that Armienti had told her that he "had improvidently
allowed someone to witness Sasso grinding gun serial numbers. " 20
On appeal, Sasso relied heavily on Williamson. The court wrote:
Williamson is not inconsistent with Matthews. First, whereas Matthews concerned only a Confrontation Clause challenge, Williamson was limited to the hearsay rule ("we need not address Williamson's claim that the statements were also made inadmissible
by the Confrontation Clause"). Furthermore, the analyses in the
two cases are consistent. In Williamson, the Court interpreted the
term "statement" within 804(b) (3) narrowly because it recogId. at 601 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
n 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
ra 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring).
23 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
24 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White,J,
dissenting).
M2See Wiliamson, 512 U.S. at 608 (Ginsburg,J., concurring). For a discussion of
the practical realities of police interrogation and an argument as to why accomplices' confessions to police are per se unreliable, see generally White, supra note
101.
2" 59 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1995).
M7 See id. at 347,
348.
22 See id. at 345-46.
229 See id. at 346.
230 Id.
2o
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nized that a declarant might attempt to shift blame to another by
mixing within a narrative true self-inculpatory statements and
false blame-shifting ones. Matthews too recognized this problem,
("to the extent that the dedarant's statement implicates another
person in the crime, it may in some circumstances constitute an
attempt to minimize the declarant's own culpability"), and for
this reason we rested our decision on the "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'" surrounding the statements, including
the fact that the statements inculpated both the declarant and defendant equally, rather than relying on mere proximity to statements inculpatory of the declarant.
Having decided that Williamson's statement against interest
analysis and its own Confrontation Clause analysis were consistent,
the Sasso court found that, in the statements, Armienti had not attempted to shift blame, that he had no reason falsely to bring Sasso
into the picture, and that the statements were not made to curry favor with the authorities or Kramer.22 Then, without parsing the
statements as suggested by Williamson, the court concluded "that the
statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability that their2 admission
"
against Sasso did not violate Sasso's confrontation rights."
A state court case in which this conflation appears is Smith v.
State.2"' In that case an accomplice told his wife that the defendant
Smith had struck the victim's head with a bat as though he were hitting a baseball. 2" In deciding whether the trial court erred in admitting the statement, the court applied Williamson. The court said:
A hearsay declaration is admissible, usually under a specific exception, only where the declaration has some theoretical basis
making it inherently trustworthy. Thus, absent some special indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, hearsay statements are inadmissible. Neutral, collateral statements enjoy no such guaran256
tees of reliability and trustworthiness.
In discussing the admission of a hearsay statement apart from
Confrontation Clause analysis, rather than citing a threshold standard that would be appropriate for the admission of such hearsay,
the court pointed to the "indicia of reliability" standard that the Supreme Court laid out as the Sixth Amendment standard in Ohio v.

252

Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
See Sasso, 59 F.3d at 849-50.

235

Id. at 350.
647 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1994).
See id. at 1085.

236

Id. at 1088 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

233
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Roberts.2 37 The court's confusion, at least in part, seems attributable
to the Supreme Court's Williamon analysis and its conflation of hearsay and the Sixth Amendment.
k 2 8 a state
This conflation is also supported by State v. Kimble
appellate case that addressed the defendant's contention that the introduction of an unavailable declarant's statement "contravenes her
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution." 9 In addressing this
claim and discussing Williarmon, the court found:
In Williamson, although choosing not to address this issue directly, the prevailing U] ustices observed that the very fact that a
statement is genuinely self-inculpatory is, itself, one of the
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" affording admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. Thus, having previously
determined Coleman's confession to24 be self-inculpatory, we discem no constitutional infringement. 0
For the Louisiana court, post-Williamson, the fact that a statement was self-inculpatory was sufficient for it to meet a Confrontation Clause challenge. Thus, Louisiana v. Kimble evinces the conflation of statements against interest and the Sixth Amendment that
occurred in Williamson.
A case that directly stated the conflation is Akins v. United
States,2 4' in which the court remanded the case for the trial court to
decide whether certain statements could have properly been admitted as declarations against penal interest.2 4 2 In Akins, the court
stated:
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the constitutional issue arising under our facts, it is likely that statements
which satisfy the requirements of the exception for declarations
against penal interest would simultaneously withstand Confrontation Clause objections. Notably, Justice O'Connor explained in
dictum that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely selfinculpatory... is itself one of the 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' that makes a statement admissible under the
Confrontation Clause."243
23
2
239
240

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

688 So.2d 552 (La. App. 1996).

Id. at 557.

Id. (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994)).
A.2d 1017 (D.C. 1996).

241 679
242

243

See id. at 1033-34.
Id. at 1033.
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Given the Supreme Court's language in Williamson, the high
standard the Court pressed for Rule 804(b) (3), and post-Williamson
cases, it seems the Court constitutionalized Rule 804(b) (3), but the
question remains as to why. Although it is often a tricky business to
ascribe motivation to an individual or even a group, I am led to the
conclusion that the Court decided the case the way it did in order to
avoid dealing with the constitutional issues and yet achieve an outcome as though it had. One commentator has observed that "Io]ne
senses that both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy fought to resolve Williamson by interpreting the text of Rule 804(b) (3) because
they were attempting to avoid the constitutional Confrontation
Clause issue."2 44 One may speculate that the Court avoided the Confrontation Clause issue because it was impossible for this Court to
decide. This is a court that produced four opinions in Williamson
and is one for which the "plurality opinion, amorphous majority, or
doctrinal zigzag" 24 5 is often the norm. To resolve the Confrontation
Clause issue, the Court would have needed to decide whether the
statement against interest exception is "firmly rooted," whether to
continue the current standard for deciding whether an exception is
"firmly rooted,"2 " and whether Williamson's Confrontation Clause
rights had been violated. Thus, the narrow and yet broad ground of
Williamson may have provided a method for reaching a decision on
admissibility as if the Confrontation Clause issue had been resolved
without inviting the discord that undoubtedly would have resulted
from this Court's efforts to resolve the more difficult constitutional
issues. It is also possible that some Justices avoided the Confrontation Clause issue out of concern that the Court's resolution of this
issue would produce a narrower or broader reading of the clause
than individual Justices might desire or a rule of interpretation at
odds with favored approaches.4 7

244 Scallen, supra note 101, at 1805.
4
Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action andJudicialIncoherence, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 79,

124 & n.153 (1994) (citing Laura K Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court,23 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 777, 820 (1990);John F. Davis &
William L. Reynolds, JuridicalCripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DuKE LJ. 59, 64; Ralph S. Spritzer, Multiple-Issue Cases and Multi-Member Courts: Observations on Decision Making by DiscordantMinorities, 28 JuRiMETRiCS J. 139, 141-45
(1988)).
246 For a persuasive argument that the firmly rooted concept
is unworkable and
that a trustworthiness standard should be applied in the admission of hearsay, see
generally Goldman, supra note 11.
247 See Cornelius M. Murphy, Note, Justice &alia and the Confrontation
Clause: A
Case Study in OriginalistAdjudication of Individual Rights, 34 Am. CiuM. L. REv. 1243
(1997). For a discussion of the Justices' reasons for producing concurring opin-
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VI. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S APPROACH

Statement against interest issues are most often discussed in the
context of criminal prosecutions, but the exception is equally applicable in civil litigation. Further, while much of the Court's analysis
in Williamson is applicable to criminal cases, the holding applies
equally to civil trials. One might argue that, because Williamson decided the rights of a criminal defendant, the case's holding should
be limited to criminal cases, but the Court's focus on the definition
of statement within Rule 804(b) (3) makes this a difficult argument
at best. Nothing in the Court's opinion would lead one to so limit
the case. Courts will apply and be required to apply the holding in
both types of proceedings. 2 "
Although a high standard for the admission of statements
against interest inculpating criminal defendants is appropriate,24 9 especially when one applies a Confrontation Clause analysis, that same
high standard seems inappropriate in civil cases and will lead to the
exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence. In civil cases, fact-finders
are better able to assess the reliability of contextual or collateral
statements and less likely to be prejudiced by their introduction.
Another problem with the Williamson opinions is the Court's
failure to give courts direction on Confrontation Clause issues and
how the statement against interest exception fits within Confrontation Clause analysis. The Court specifically stated:
[W]e need not address Williamson's claim that the statements
were also made inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause, and in
particular we need not decide whether the hearsay exception for
declarations against interest is "firmly rooted" for Confrontation
Clause purposes. Compare, e.g., United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1,2
(CAI 1989) (holding that the exception is firmly rooted), with
United States v. Rores, 985 F.2d 770 (CA5 1993) (holding the contrary). °

ions, see Ray, supra note 245.
248 See Ciccarelli v. Gichner Sys. Group, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1293 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
Also, while Wi//iamson does not interpret the state counterparts to Rule 804(b) (3),
the decision is likely to influence state courts' practices. See CHRIsTOPHER B.
MuszRi & LAiRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RuLES 389 (3d ed. 1996).
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1994); State v. Coates, 661 So. 2d 571
(La. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Matusky, 682 A.2d 694 (Md. 1996); Cofield v. State, 891
S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Mason, 460 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1995).
249 See generally Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why is
This Right Different From All OtherRights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994).
W Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994) (citing White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346 (1992)).
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This ducking of the Sixth Amendment issues is bound to continue the confusion and disarray among the circuit courts. There
will be no short-term resolution of the "firmly rooted" issue and the
division among the circuits on this issue will persist. In addition, because of the lack of guidance on the place of the statements against
interest exception in Confrontation Clause analysis, courts are likely
to misapply Williamson, especially when also faced with a Confrontation Clause issue.
Two examples of the types of errors that courts may make are illustrated by the previously discussed cases of Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc.5 1 and United States v. Sasso.2 52 In Ciccarelli, the court,
in deciding what portions of an affidavit should have been admitted,
decided that only those portions that were self-inculpatory should be
admitted and that they should exclude portions that referred to others.25' A cursory reading of Williamson seems to require this rather
simple approach, but the Williamson Court advised lower courts that
"whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context."2m This suggestion of a wider inquiry,
apparently lost on the Ciccarelli court, 5 would more likely be understood if the Court had addressed the Confrontation Clause issue,
which necessarily relies on the importance of context. In Sasso,
again because of the conflation of Rule 804(b) (3) and the Confrontation Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit read Williamson as consistent with its own decision in Matthews, a case decided on Confrontation Clause grounds. 2m The court,
ignoring the narrow reading of statement and the analysis of the Supreme Court in Williamson, applied only Confrontation Clause analysis to the hearsay and found that the out of court declarations, although they named various others and possibly shifted blame, "bore
sufficient indicia of reliability that their admission against Sasso did
not violate Sasso's confrontation rights."27 Had the Supreme Court
set out the interplay of its statement against interest analysis with

862 F. Supp. 1293 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
59 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1995).
253
See supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603.
For a discussion of Ciccarelli'sapplication of the Williamson standard, see generally Emily F. Duck, Note, The Williamson Standard for the Exception to the Rule
Against Hearsayfor Statements Against PenalInterest, 85J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1084
(1995).
2
For a discussion of Sasso, see supra notes 226-233 and accompanying text.
27
Sasso, 59 F.3d at 350.
251

2
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Confrontation Clause analysis, it is less likely the Second Circuit
would have so lightly skipped over the Williamson analysis.
The Williamson Court also failed to deal with issues raised by exculpatory statements and the treatment of these statements under
Rule 804(b) (3). For example, the Court did not address the issue of
whether corroboration, required for statements exculpating the accused,2 is needed for the proper introduction of statements inculpating the accused.2" The opinion also failed to discuss the introduction of exculpatory statements and what corroboration is
required for these.
Although the failure to discuss some types of exculpatory statements is not problematic-for example, statements in which the declarant admits involvement and the circumstances preclude the accused's involvement-in many instances the Williamson decision is
likely to create problems for courts analyzing exculpatory statements
and is likely to lead to the exclusion of statements that may otherwise
be highly reliable. In this latter category are statements that both
name and exculpate the accused. Although some courts will admit
references to the accused where the part exculpating the defendant
"has a close narrative and logical connection to the part implicating
the speaker" and references to the accused are inculpatory of the declarant,- many courts are likely to find that most references to the
accused are not against the speaker's interest and will preclude their
introduction."' This outcome is likely to please (1) those who opposed the inclusion of the against penal interest exception for fear
that trumped-up confessions would be used to exonerate the guilty
and (2) those who pressed for the inclusion of the corroboration requirement.2 2 Unfortunately, the exclusion of many reliable exculpatory statements is likely to be another of the unintended consequences of the Williamson decision and is a result of the Court's
failure to address exculpatory statements.
While implicitly avoiding discussing exculpatory statements, the
Court explicitly stated that it

25
259

SeFED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3).

See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.

260

MuruIaR& KIRKPATRCK, supranote 154, at 1051.

261

For a discussion of the introduction of inculpatory and exculpatory references

see supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text, and infra notes 264-271 and accompanying text. See generally Ciccarelli v. Gichner Sys. Group, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
1293 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
262

For a discussion of the history of Rule 804, see 4 MuELLER & KIRKPATRICK, su-

pra note 37, at 708-24.
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need not decide whether, as some Courts of Appeals have held,
the second sentence of Rule 804(b) (3)-"A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement" (emphasis
added)-also requires that statements incupating the accused be
supported by corroborating circumstances.
The failure of the Court to decide this issue has perpetuated a
split in authority among the circuits, some requiring corroboration
for the introduction of statements against interest that are inculpatory,m and others admitting inculpatory declarations against interest
6
without corroboration.2
- Due process and equal protection principles argue strongly for symmetrical application of the corroboration
requirement, 2 6 but such a reading is contrary to the plain meaning
of the rule. Lack of guidance from the Court on whether constitutional protection should dictate a movement away from the plain
meaning of the rule has left courts and practitioners to define their
own solutions.
Having failed to address the corroboration requirement for exculpatory statements, the Court naturally did not discuss what evidence might be used for corroboration. This failure is especially
troubling because of the likely dichotomy between evidence that may
be used for corroboration for hearsay purposes and evidence that
may be used for corroboration for constitutional purposes. The dichotomy exists because of the Court's holding in Idaho v. Wright. 7
In Wright, the Court found that only the circumstances "that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant
particularly worthy of belief' could be used to support the statement's reliability under the Confrontation Clause.6
Conversely, in
deciding on the admissibility of hearsay and corroboration for exculpatory statements against interest, courts have a great deal more
latitude. Under Rule 804(b) (3), exculpatory statements may be admitted where there are "corroborating circumstances [that] clearly
26

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
See also United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1418, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1990)

(holding that corroboration is required for the admission of inculpatory statements
against interest).

See United States v. Bakhtiar, 994 F.2d 970, 978 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Peter W. Tague, Perils of the RulemakingProcess: The Development, Application,

and Unconstitutionalityof Rule 804(b)(3)s Penal InterestException, 69 Gzo. LJ. 851, 990
(1981).
W 497 U.S. 805 (1990). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
26a Wight, 497 U.S. at 819.
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indicate the trustworthiness" of the statement.2 9 This corroboration
requirement certainly "is satisfied by independent evidence that directly or circumstantially tends to prove the points for which the
statement is offered. But the term 'corroborating circumstances'
seems much broader .... ,0 They might include the fact that the
declarant repeated the statement or that the speaker "is unavailable
at trial because he properly claims his privilege against selfincrimination .... 71
The dichotomy between what may be considered in assessing an
inculpatory statement's reliability and what may be used as corroboration for an exculpatory statement is less troubling than the dichotomy between requiring corroboration for exculpatory statements but
not for statements that are inculpatory. This is so because both limiting the circumstances that may be considered in testing the reliability of an inculpatory statement and taking a broad view of the factors
that may be considered in corroborating an exculpatory statement
inure to the benefit of the defendant. Despite the lower level of
concern, this area is another where guidance from the Court would
have been helpful to courts in applying the statement against interest exception.
VII. A BETTER APPROACH TO RESOLVING STATEMENT AGAINST
INTEREST AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PROBLEMS

A more appropriate approach to resolving statement against interest and Confrontation Clause issues would be to recognize the distinct stages or steps involved in the decisions and avoid the conflation of exception and constitutional analysis. After deciding the
unavailability of the declarant,272 a court needs to discern if any portion of a statement is against interest and, if so, which parts of the
statement are against interest, which portions are self-serving, and
whether there are any portions that are neither against interest nor
self-serving. Although simple enough to state, this analysis is difficult
to apply because it involves complex and context bound fact-based
69
270

FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3).
4 MuzuIR & KIRKPATRiC K, supra note 37, at 851; see alSo 5

WEiNSMN

& BERGER,

supra note 33, at 153 (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1985)).
4 MUEu.ar & KiRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 852; see also UNrr= STATES V.
LOPEZ, 777 F.2D 543, 554 (10TH CIR. 1985) (concluding that absence of fingerprints
on cocaine containers along with other facts was sufficient corroboration).
22 See FED. R. EvID. 804(a). Although beyond the scope
of this article, the decision on availability is itself quite complex. See generaly Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70

MINN. L. Rzv. 665 (1986).
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determinations!" What at first may appear neutral as to interest may
be, when examined in context, against interest.24 The difficulty of
making these decisions is increased because the judge will be making
assumptions about the understanding of the declarant at the time
the statement was made.2 5
After the statement is parsed for its against interest, self-serving,
and neutral portions, the court should exclude those portions that
are self-serving. Once this determination is made and before beginning its Confrontation Clause analysis, the court should decide
which of the neutral portions are sufficiently related or "integral"' "
to the against interest portion to be admitted and which are too attenuated in time, narrative, or meaning to warrant admission. 2 7 In
civil cases, the analysis should end here with the court admitting
those portions that are against interest and the neutral portions that
are closely related. 27
At this stage in criminal cases, the court should begin its Confrontation Clause analysis. The court should decide whether the
statement has sufficient reliability or "indicia of reliability" to be admitted absent confrontation. 2 9 Many of the factors and circumstances that were used by the court in deciding whether the statement was against interest will also be used in deciding whether the
statement has sufficient indications of reliability to be admitted in
the face of the unavailability of the declarant for cross-examination.
One factor that will be obvious from the earlier parsing is whether
the statement, assuming it is an accomplice's confession, was made
to the police or others. This is especially important because, for
Confrontation Clause purposes, there is a presumption of unreliability in an accomplice's confession to. the police.2 80 Other factors to
examine include whether the declarant sought to mitigate her or his
own culpability, whether the declarant sought retaliation against the
accused, and whether the statement was given to curry favor with

27

See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 620 (1994) (Kennedy, J., con-

curring).
274

See MUELTER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 248, at 389.

"[I]sn't it true that just

being part of an against-interest statement can make other statements against interest that otherwise might not be?" Id.
275 For a discussion of the decision, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
276 United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1980).
rn See supranotes 47-56 and accompanying text.
278 Of course, prejudice might weigh in favor of exclusion. See FED.
R. EvID. 403;
see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 804-45.
2" See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
280 See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
539 (1986).
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8 ' The timing of the confession will also be important.
authorities.2
For example, if the confession is the second one given to the police,
3
they will be able to form the statement in a preconceived fashion.
Unlike the standard for exception admission, given the holding in
Lee 28 the standard for Confrontation Clause admission must be one
that overcomes the presumption of unreliability. One way to ensure
meeting this standard may be to adopt the suggestion of Professor
Nesson that the admission of hearsay over a Confrontation Clause
objection should be allowed only if "the hearsay is independently
corroborated."'
Although the use of corroboration is at odds with the holding in
Idaho v. Wright 2's the long term viability of that decision is questionable. First, Wright was a 5-4 decision, and two Justices from the majority have since retired. Second, "[o]ften corroborating evidence is
strong proof of important points in a statement, and Wright's approach to the difficulties in this area is not promising."2" Third, as
the dissenters in Wright argued, there is "no difference between the
factors that the Court believes indicate 'inherent trustworthiness'
and those, like corroborating evidence, that apparently do not."' 7
Fourth, earlier Supreme Court decisions had used corroborating
facts in testing reliability.2 Finally, some scholars have suggested
that Wright's "bar against considering independent corroborative
evidence should be dropped."'"
A corroboration requirement would accomplish much in assuring that only hearsay of a constitutionally-reliable nature is admitted
against a criminal defendant. Absent the corroboration requirement, the analysis suggested here is unlikely to produce outcomes at
variance with an application of Williamson, but it would avoid the limits the Court has placed on statements against interest in civil cases
and provide clearer guidance to lower courts on these issues.'
281

See id. at 544-45.

M See id at 544.
283 See id.
29 Nesson & Benkler, supra note 11, at 173; see also Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 827 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2
497 U.S. 805 (1990).

2W MuELa.Lz & IRKPATRICK, supra note 154, at 1068.

Wright, 497 U.S. at 833 (KennedyJ, dissenting).
See, e.g., Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192 (1987); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 546 (1986); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion).
2" Mu.ERR & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 154, at 1068 (citing Imwinkelried,
supra
note 182, at 528-29).
"0 This analysis is also likely to avoid some of the other problems created by the
Williamson decision. See supra notes 248-262 and accompanying text.
287
2
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Before Williamson, the common law authority on declarations
against interest and the weight of decisional law on Rule 804(b) (3)
allowed for the admission of collateral statements. In addition, Confrontation Clause analysis and statement against interest analysis differed in that the Confrontation Clause standard for admission was
higher because of the indicia of reliability requirement in Roberts and
the presumption against admission in the case of statements against
interest that were the confessions of accomplices to authorities.
The Williamson decision, in raising the bar for the admission of
statements against interest, brings admissible statements to the point
where there is little, if any, value in testing by cross-examination.
This higher standard eliminates many reliable portions of statements
against interest, especially in civil cases, and has resulted in a conflation of statement against interest and Confrontation Clause analysis.
This conflation arises in part because of the Court's failure to distinguish between admission reliability and Confrontation Clause reliability.
Williamson, in failing to grapple with the constitutional issues,
has left many statement against interest issues unresolved and failed
to provide lower courts with guidance when deciding criminal cases
involving statements against interest.

